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Abstract. Theory of Probability is distinguished by several high-level
philosophical attitudes, some stressed by Jeffreys, some implicit. By
reviewing these we may recognize the importance in this work in the
historical development of statistics.
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Jeffreys is one of the major figures in the history of
statistics, and Theory of Probability is his chief work
on the subject. It is wonderful that Robert, Chopin,
and Rousseau (RCR) have devoted so much effort
to pouring through the book. Their insights will be
appreciated by all future readers.
The two elements of Bayesian analysis most
strongly attributed to Jeffreys are Bayes factors and
the selection of priors by formal rules. My own un-
derstanding of these subjects was embedded in a
pair of reviews roughly 15 years ago (Kass and
Raftery, 1995; Kass and Wasserman, 1996). Now,
however, my priorities have evolved—I have spent
much of the past 10 years worrying about the appli-
cation of statistics to problems in neuroscience, and
trying to identify the most important lessons from
our discipline that should be passed on to budding
data analysts. I would like to offer a few comments
on Jeffreys’s legacy from this current perspective.
Or, perhaps my aim is better communicated by ask-
ing, How should our legacy be informed by Jeffreys’s
legacy? Before getting to this high-level question I
would like to make one technical remark.
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1. GEOMETRY
It is worth noting Jeffreys’s clear geometrical think-
ing in his choice of general prior, discussed at the
beginning of RCR’s Section 4.7. The lurking dif-
ferential geometry is subtle, as he says only that
Hellinger distance and Kullback–Leibler divergence
“have the form of the square of an element of dis-
tance in curvilinear coordinates,” but, in addition,
his notation gik for the (i, k) element of the Fisher
information matrix is the standard notation of his
day for the elements of the matrix representation
for a Riemannian metric. It was obvious that the
Riemannian natural volume element—the determi-
nant of the matrix representation of the metric—
would be invariant and, as argued in Kass (1989),
this provides a bit of intuition. In addition, basic to
Jeffreys’s treatment of Bayes factors was his use of
orthogonal parameters (see Section 5.01 of Theory of
Probability and Section 6.1 of RCR)—which are “or-
thogonal” in the sense of differential geometry. Fur-
thermore, his use of his general prior for Bayes fac-
tors, discussed in RCR Section 6.4, is again intelligi-
ble as a prior (approximately) on the resulting Rie-
mannian distance (the “information distance” dis-
cussed in Kass, 1989). I have always assumed this
was an important part of Jeffreys’s thought process.
2. THE BAYESIAN ENGINE
As I look back again, now, on Theory of Probabil-
ity I find four particularly striking features.
First, it treated a wide variety of problems, many
of which continue to be of interest. [A list of a dozen
such problems appeared in Kass (1991) as part of a
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special issue of Chance devoted to the 100th an-
niversary of Jeffreys’s birth.] In this integration of
theory and practice it became a model text. Indeed,
in the intervening years there has been an unfor-
tunate bifurcation of theory and practice, so that
theoretical texts rarely give the kind of attention to
practical problems that Jeffreys did.
Second, it relied on first-order approximation, via
Laplace’s method, especially to center the posterior
at the MLE (though modern applications often use
the posterior mode). This is noteworthy, in part, be-
cause it played a fundamental role in his views on
selecting priors. Jeffreys admitted the choice of prior
was somewhat arbitrary, but he pointed out that
asymptotic considerations made this degree of arbi-
trariness a rather minor practical difficulty. Over the
years there has been some misunderstanding of Jef-
freys’s point of view because it changed over time in
response to critics—this is one reason it is worth ex-
amining the multiple editions of his book. (See Kass
and Wasserman, 1995, Section 2.) Furthermore, we
see in Jeffreys’s use of Laplace’s method the germs of
Bayesian computation: he recognized, more clearly
than many subsequent researchers, who were con-
cerned with exact results, how Bayes’s theorem could
be applied in a wide range of analytically intractable
problems. And, of course, first-order asymptotics
brought Jeffreys’s methods into close agreement with
Fisher’s. In the preface of the first edition of The-
ory of Probability Jeffreys stated, “There is, on the
whole, a very good agreement with the recommen-
dations made in statistical practice.” In my view it
is worth emphasizing the use of first-order asymp-
totics because much elaborate, painstaking statisti-
cal work ends up being useful in scientific inference
mainly in its ability to provide a well-founded esti-
mate and standard error. In contemplating the prac-
tical value of his treatise, Jeffreys recognized this as
well when he said, in the preface to its third edition,
“There is a decided improvement in the willingness
of physicists to estimate uncertainties of their re-
sults properly, and I suppose that I can claim some
of the credit for this.”
A third striking high-level feature of Theory of
Probability is its championing of posterior probabil-
ities of hypotheses (Bayes factors), which made a
huge contribution to epistemology. Emanating from
his early work with Dorothy Wrinch, this was Jef-
freys’s main motivation for writing the book. In the
preface to the first edition he wrote,
In opposition to the statistical school, [phys-
icists] and some other scientists are liable
to say that a hypothesis is definitely proved
by observation, which is certainly a log-
ical fallacy; most statisticians appear to
regard observations as a basis for possi-
bly rejecting hypotheses, but in no case
for supporting them. The latter attitude,
if adopted consistently, would reduce all
inductive inference to guesswork; the for-
mer, if adopted consistently, would make
it imposssible ever to alter the hypotheses,
however badly they agreed with new evi-
dence. . . . In the present book I . . . main-
tain that the ordinary common-sense no-
tion of probability is capable of precise
and consistent treatment when once an
adequate language is provided for it. It
leads to the results that a precisely stated
hypothesis may attain either a high or a
negligible probability as a result of obser-
vational data.
In showing the world the importance of Bayes’ the-
orem, Jeffreys succeeded spectacularly well. The no-
tion that Bayes’ theorem can describe, with beauti-
ful brevity, the way we incorporate information to
gain knowledge is very widely accepted—even by
those, within and outside of statistics, who are not
very fond of Bayesian statistical methods in prac-
tice. Laplace made an important start, but Jeffreys
took the argument much further by showing how
Bayes’ theorem may be connected with the funda-
mental aspirations of science.
Jeffreys’s observations opened the door to a uni-
fication of epistemology with scientific inference via
statistical methodology. This was his great goal, and
it has remained a goal of Bayesian “true believers”
ever since, even for those who have discarded parts
of Jeffreys’s philosophy and replaced it with subjec-
tivist foundations. There is an undeniable allure of
the power and simplicity of the Bayesian approach—
I see it in neuroscience as well as statistics—but, in
my opinion, despite all its spendor, the Bayesian ap-
proach has not realized the goal of unifying statisti-
cal inference, nor is it likely to do so in the forseeable
future.
There are many reasons for the failure of the
Bayesian grand scheme—in the face of all the Bayesian
successes—but one important difficulty is the dis-
crepancy between the conceptual, epistemological
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use of posterior probabilities and their use in prac-
tice. In practice, posterior probabilities are used for
model selection (e.g, in reversible jump MCMC) and
classification, but they are almost never used in the
manner Jeffreys emphasized, namely, to provide ev-
idence in favor of scientific hypotheses. Frequentist
significance testing (via bootstrap and permutation
tests) is pretty easy, even in relatively complicated
situations. Bayesian testing, however, is in one re-
spect difficult even setting aside computational is-
sues: although (as reviewed in Kass and Raftery,
1995) Bayes factors are generally not sensitive to pri-
ors on suitably-defined nuisance parameters (“null
orthogonal” parameters in the sense of Kass, 1989),
they remain sensitive—to first order—to the choice
of prior on the parameter being tested. This implies
that interpretations such as Jeffreys’s, reported by
RCR, are contaminated by a constant that does not
go away asymptotically. Indeed, this is the reason
for the large range of values within Jeffreys’s inter-
pretive categories. One may see this as a virtue of
the Bayesian approach, that its very ambiguity pro-
vides a more thorough (“honest”) assessment of ev-
idence, but it does impose a burden on those who
wish to make scientific inferences. In some applied
situations, the evidence may be “decisive” over a
wide enough range of priors to be convincing, and
it is possible that continuing research will eventu-
ally bring Bayes factors into widespread scientific
use. I can report, though, that in neuroscience, de-
spite considerable penetration of Bayesian ideas and
Bayesian methods, Bayes factors for scientific hy-
pothesis testing are essentially non-existent. And I
have yet to find a good application for them, myself.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent over-reach of
the Bayesian aspiration set forth by Jeffreys, these
first three components of Theory of Probability demon-
strated constructively the great power of the Bayesian
engine. It had a tremendous influence on the next
generation of books, which in turn educated those
who became soldiers in the “Bayesian revolution”
during the 1990s.
3. DECISION THEORY
Theory of Probability articulated only one of the
two crucial elements in the emergence of modern
Bayesian analysis, in statistics and throughout
science: Bayes’ Theorem as an engine for scientific
inference. The second element, the optimality of
Bayesian procedures, including especially the opti-
mality of Bayes classifiers, had to wait for Wald (and
then others such as Savage and Raiffa and Schlaif-
fer). It is impossible to sing the praises of Theory of
Probability without emphasizing the continuing im-
portance of optimality. As RCR point out, Jeffreys
did mention the performance of methods, and in fact
noted the optimality of the Bayes factor in balancing
type I and type II errors, but this appears largely
as an afterthought in response to Neyman and Pear-
son, rather than as the fundamental motivation that
frequentist optimality subsequently became.
4. STATISTICAL MODELS AND SCIENTIFIC
LAWS
The fourth feature of Theory of Probability that
remains, at least to me, especially important is its
identification of scientific laws with statistical mod-
els. Jeffreys put it this way:
A physical law is not an exact prediction,
but a statement of the relative probabili-
ties of variations of different amounts.
This passage appeared in the first edition of the
book, and was italicized in the second and third
editions. The point of view is echoed throughout
Theory of Probability and it stands in contrast to
anything declared by Fisher.
I see this as crucially important to our contem-
porary situation. In a recent article, Emery Brown
and I (Brown and Kass, 2009) noted our disgruntle-
ment with much data analysis we have seen in neu-
roscience. We put it this way:
We have seen many highly quantitative re-
searchers trained in physics and engineer-
ing, but not statistics, apply sophisticated
techniques to analyze their data. These
are often appropriate, and sometimes in-
ventive and interesting. In the course of
perusing many, many articles over the years,
however, we have found ourselves criti-
cal of much published work. Starting with
vague intuitions, particular algorithms are
concocted and applied, from which strong
scientific statements are made. Our reac-
tion is too frequently negative: we are du-
bious of the value of the approach, believ-
ing alternatives to be much preferable; or
we may concede that a particular method
might possibly be a good one, but the au-
thors have done nothing to indicate that it
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performs well. In specific settings, we of-
ten come to the opinion that the science
would advance more quickly if the prob-
lems were formulated differently—formulated
in a manner more familiar to trained statis-
ticians.
This led us to consider what statistical training
brings to the table, and we articulated a succinct
answer in the form of a pair of dogmas of modern
statistical thinking:
1. Statistical models of regularity and variability in
data are used to express knowledge and uncer-
tainty about a signal in the presence of noise, via
inductive reasoning.
2. Statistical methods may be analyzed to deter-
mine how well they are likely to perform.
The claim was not that these two things describe
what statisticians do, but rather that they charac-
terize the way they think. The implication, and the
main subject of that article, was that we as a profes-
sion should conscientiously emphasize these points
in our teaching and curriculum development. Here, I
would like to add that the first item, stressing statis-
tical models, is central in Theory of Probability. Our
modern notion of statistical model is much broader
than that of Jeffreys, and owes much to Fisher. For
example, statistical models are used in bootstrap
and permutation tests, as well as a host of nonpara-
metric inference and prediction methods. However,
the point that statistical models drive the process re-
mains at the essence of our discipline. (For interest-
ing related remarks see Cox, 2001 and Efron, 2001.)
To me, this is the most fundamental message of the
Theory of Probability.
On the other hand, we can’t neglect the second
item above, performance of methods. This is equally
important to our discipline—yet it is largely absent
from Theory of Probability (and crucial aspects are
also absent from Fisher).
5. ON RE-READING JEFFREYS
Because of Jeffreys’s emphasis on the connection
between scientific laws and statistical models, re-
reading Theory of Probability always leaves me with
a burning question: What is the scientific status
of a statistical model? That is, in using a statis-
tical model, to what extent are we making scientific
claims?
This foundational issue, at once philosophical and
practical, has received considerable discussion over
the years, and deserves continued attention. Lehmann
and Cox, in special lectures and articles, both pointed
out that the extent to which a model is “explana-
tory” or “empirical” depends on context (Lehmann,
1990; Cox, 1990), and Lehmann cited Kruskal and
Neyman (1956) in saying the distinction is not rigid:
“[These descriptions] represent somewhat extreme
points of a continuum.” Freedman repeatedly criti-
cized claims based on statistical models because he
felt they were empirical in nature yet were used in-
appropriately for explanation (e.g., Freedman and
Zeisel, 1988, Statistical Science). The nature of sta-
tistical models is closely related to the nature of
scientific models (or theories), which are often re-
garded as either “real” or “instrumental” (see Stan-
ford, 2006). It is worth asking whether, and how,
statistical models are essentially different than other
kinds of scientific models.
In discussing the connection between statistical
models and scientific laws, some of Jeffreys’s favorite
examples are chosen for their rhetorical value, such
as gravitation. Such nice clean examples where sci-
entific theories are extremely precise are, however,
quite rare. Certainly in neuroscience the “theories,”
even when stated mathematically, are supposed to
be provide only rough approximations to reality.
The same can be argued in principle in physics, but
in the biological realm the “rough approximation”
is very rough.
Perhaps all models are similar in their attempt
to describe the world, but we in statistics are con-
scious of their shortcomings, especially when they
are statistical models. And perhaps contributions
can come from the quintessential statistical attitude,
“All models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box,
1979), implemented by stressing essential features
captured by models that do represent scientific claims,
from inessential features that do not.
In any case, as RCR so thoroughly demonstrate,
Theory of Probability is full of weighty material.
Reading it from a contemporary perspective opens
up all kinds of questions; questions of detail, and
questions about the nature of our discipline. One
thing is for sure: it is a landmark in the history of
statistics. Reading it helps us better understand the
conceptual development of our subject.
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